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A Tale of Two Cases
William H. Agnor*
Professor Agnor here traces the development of what he suggests
is a bad rule of law which originated in a poor decision of a jurisdic-
tion highly respected for its decisions on the law of future interests.
The author's demonstration of how the case has been blindly followed
by both bench and bar underscores his message that members of the
legal profession must not rely on encyclopedic statements of the law
without an examination into the policies and problems involved.
Some thirty years ago at the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, one of the topics for discussion at the Property
and Status Round Table was "Is Future Interests for the Few?"'
This discussion had reference to the teaching of a course in Future
Interests in law schools, but the same question can be asked of
bench and bar today. For too many lawyers, the area is sort of a
never-never land and they make no real attempt to understand the
legal problems involved. Instead, they search for some encyclopaedic
statement and accept it at face value. Such statements in an encyclo-
pedia, or in a treatise or the Restatement, are too often taken from
one poorly decided case that is not necessarily the best approach
to the problem or even the majority approach. All too often in the
area of future interests this has been a case decided by the Massa-
chusetts court. The Restatement cites the case, then the Massachusetts
court in a later case cites the Restatement, other citations follow, and
the rule is refurbished in this fashion.
A major problem and source of bad law is the inclination of too
many lawyers and judges today to rely on the nice encyclopaedic
statement in the area of future interests rather than to really examine
the problem and face the issues involved. As stated by the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals in an action by beneficiaries under a will for
damages against an attorney engaged by testator to prepare the will:
We agree the subject is difficult, but the law today has its specialties, and
even as the general practitioner in medicine must seek the aid of the
specialist in his profession, so the general practitioner in law, when faced
with a problem beyond his capabilities, must turn to the expert in his
profession to the end that his client is properly served.2
* Professor of Law, Emory University.
1. A.A.L.S. PROcEEDiNGS 140 (1933). It is interesting to note that another type
at the same round table was "Should Personal Property be Dropped from the Law
School Curriculum?"
2. Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal. Rptr. 727, 731 (Cal. App. 1961).
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The statement by the Supreme Court of California in reversing the
Court of Appeals is much more to the liking of the lazy lawyer. The
court said:
In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on
alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by defendant
in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that defendant
failed to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill
and capacity commonly exercise.3
It is the obligation of counsel to present the issues in a case to the
court so that they may be considered properly. If counsel relies
solely on encyclopaedic statements, the court is likely to follow and
compound the error.
With full awareness of the dangers involved in tilting with wind-
mills on hallowed ground, two Massachusetts cases will be considered.
They are First Universalist Society v. Boland4 and Rice v. Boston &
Worcester R.R.5
The First Universalist case stands for a number of propositions,
but only one is to be considered here. It held that where a determina-
ble fee was followed by a conditional limitation over that was void
for remoteness, it remained a determinable fee with a resulting possi-
bility of reverter in the grantor. It is suggested that this was bad law,
was poorly decided, and did not follow precedent. Gray attacked
the case on several grounds, especially as to the approval of a deter-
minable fee,6 but in stating the rule as to the effect of the void
limitation over he ignored the case and stated that the determinable
fee would become a fee simple.7 This is the only situation where a
distinction has been drawn as to the nature of a defeasible fee when
followed by an executory interest.
The difficulty in the case lies in a failure to recognize that two
separate rules of property law are involved. One basic rule of the
defeasible fee is that if the defeasing event be invalid for any reason,
such as being illegal, immoral, impossible or repugnant, the defeasible
fee becomes absolute, freed of the invalid event. Some of Black-
stone's illustrations are now out of date." Here the defeasing event
is void for remoteness, so another principle comes into view. Under
the Rule Against Perpetuities, when an end limitation is void for
remoteness, prior estates remain just as created in the instrument,
3. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826
(1961).
4. 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892).
5. 94 Mass. (12Allen) 141 (1866).
6. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETurI=s § 40 (3d ed. 1915).
7. Id. § 247 (4th ed. 1942).
8. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *157.
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absent application of the doctrine of "infectious invalidity." Thus in
the First Universalist case, the court refused to reconcile the two
principles and held that the determinable fee remained a determinable
fee. The court cited and relied on the Brattle Square case,9 but did
not seem to understand it. The Brattle Square case clearly did not
intend in any way to state any difference in its rule, whether the prior
estate in defeasible fee could be called a determinable fee or a fee on
condition subsequent. It is a clear and well reasoned decision and
should have been followed. The court stated:
Therefore a gift of the fee or the entire interest, subject to an executory
limitation which is too remote, takes effect as if it had been originally
limited free from any devesting [sic] gift. . . .Nor does it make any
difference in the application of this well settled rule of law to the present
case, that the testatrix in terms declares that the gift to the deacons and
their successors shall be void, if the prescribed conditions be not fulfilled.
The legal effect of all conditional limitations is to make void and terminate
the previous estate upon the happening of the designated contingency, and
to vest the title in those to whom the estate is limited over by the terms
of the gift or grant .... The condition, being accompanied by a limitation
over which is void in law, fails of effect, and the estate becomes absolute
in the first takers. 10
Quite a number of jurisdictions have had no trouble in applying this
rule." Had the First Universalist case properly followed the Brattle
Square case, the difficulties in Brown v. Independent Baptist Church2
would not have arisen. The church would have owned the land in
fee simple, freed of the defeasing event. Instead, by finding a
possibility of reverter in the grantor, the number and distribution
of the heirs caused quite a problem.1
3
It is not intended here to consider at length the problem of the
two possible solutions. The better rule seems obvious. Rather, it is
intended to chart some of the path of the First Universalist case and
the trap it has laid.
The most frequently used encyclopedias cite the First Universalist
9. Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142
(1855).
10. Id. at 156, 159-60.
11. E.g., Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 91 Atl. 191 (1914); McGlothlin v.
McElvain, 407 Il1. 142, 95 N.E.2d 68 (1950); Outland v. Bowen, 115 Ind. 150, 17
N.E. 281 (1888); McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Educ., 285 Ky. 769, 149
S.W.2d 519 (1941); McMahon v. St. Paul's Reformed Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A.2d
122 (1950); Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N.H. 238, 45 At. 1087 (1898);
Palmer v. Union Bank, 17 R.I. 627, 24 Atl. 109 (1892); Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis.
617, 53 N.W. 905 (1892); Annots., 28 A.L.R. 375, 394 (1924); 75 A.L.R. 124 (1931);
168 A.L.R. 321 (1947).
12. 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
13. For a review of this problem, see Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending
the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HxAv. L. Rv. 721, 741 (1952).
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case as the authority for their stated rule, following it alone. 14 It
does not appear to have been disputed by most text writers. Gray
was so preoccupied in disclaiming the approval of the determinable
fee in the First Universalist case that he did not consider the problem
in detail, but does not seem to have accepted this rule." Most other
modem text writers seem to have meekly accepted this rule of the
First Universalist case without question.16 They fail to cite any of
the numerous cases to the contrary. The First Universalist case was
accepted as gospel by the American Law Institute and this caused a
number of variations in their comments to accept all of its features. 7
In a monograph by the reporter, he states that the Brattle Square case
might be contra, but says: "This extreme position is inconsistent with
the weight of American authority, does not seem reasonable and has
been rejected by the Restatement."18 His "weight of authority" is the
First Universalist case, two of its descendants, and one early New
York case.19
It may be hard to build sand on sand, but with "Restatement
glue" it seems possible. The Massachusetts court in two other cases
has added to the First Universalist case the additional citation of the
Restatement and used both as authority.20
It is one thing for a court to consider the principles involved and
reach the same conclusion as the First Universalist case and quite
another blindly to cite and follow it with no real understanding of
the problem; and herein lies the danger. The Tennessee court added
more bait to the trap by simply citing and following the case in
Yarbrough v. Yarbrough.2'
One annotator has accepted the First Universalist case as complete
authority, even though he admits that it is contra to the Brattle
Square case and other early Massachusetts. cases.22 Thus, the trap is
set. One questionable case has fixed the statement of the law in most
14. 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities § 22 (1951); 19 AM. Jt. Estates § 34 (1939); 41 Ais.
Jun. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation §§ 31, 63 (1942).
15. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEPm'Turrms §§ 41, 247, 248, 312, app. E (4th ed.
1942).
16. E.g., 6 AMERuCAN LAW OF PRoPERTY § 24.47 (1952); 2 PowELL, REAL PnoPEuT
1 306 (1950); but see 5 PowELi, REAL PnoPERTY I[ 789 (1962); SImEs & Si=Tr,
FUTuRE INTERESTS §§ 823, 1263 (1956).
17. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 44-47, 229 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §3
372, 403 (1944).
18. RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY app. at 36-37 (1944)..
19. Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. (4 Smith) 96 (1858). But cf. Walker v. Marcellus
& Otisco Lake Ry., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919).
20. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950);
Institution for Savings in Roxbury v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583,
139 N.E. 301 (1923).
21. 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925).
22. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1154 (1956).
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of the secondary authorities, so dear to the lawyer or judge in a
hurry. The Virginia court accepted the rule.2 3 The Arkansas court
also based an opinion solely on the authority of the First Universalist
case, saying that it was not aware of any decision to the contrary.
24
Another Arkansas case added citations to the Restatement, a treatise
and another Massachusetts case.25 The Mississippi
26 and the Missouri2 7
courts followed along, citing mostly secondary authority descended
from the First Universalist case. The Kansas court, not citing the
usual sources, ruled to the contrary, although a restraint on alienation
was also involved in that caseY2
The Pennsylvania court fell headlong into the trap. Citing illustra-
tions from the Restatement, the First Universalist case and its judicial
descendants in Arkansas and Tennessee, the court completely accepted
this rule.29 In citing the First Universalist case, the court said that
it had been cited with approval in over fifty decisions by appellate
courts of twenty-six states.3 A more careful check would have re-
vealed that most of these citations had to do with the approval of
the determinable fee, a fact not shown by Shepard's Citations. The
court did not consider earlier Pennsylvania cases to the contrary,
31
nor a section of the Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947 that states:
"A void interest following a valid interest on condition subsequent
or special limitation shall vest in the owner of such valid interest."3
Whether these cases and the statute were not mentioned by counsel,
or whether they were mentioned and ignored by the court, is best
left to conjecture.
Thus, this rule from the First Universalist case has been accepted
by most secondary authorities and by a half dozen states, largely with-
out any real consideration of the principles involved. The resulting rule
is not desirable. By way of illustration, suppose that A conveys land
to a church in determinable fee, so long as used for church purposes,
with an executory interest or conditional limitation to B (a non-
charity). A hundred years later, church use ceases. Admittedly,
B's interest is void for remoteness. Under the the rule of the First
Universalist case, A would have retained a possibility of reverter and
it will be necessary to find his heirs. Under the better rule, the
23. County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38 (1950).
24. Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 448 (1950).
25. McCrory School Dist. v. Brogden, 231 Ark. 664, 333 S.W.2d 246 (1960).
26. Jones v. Bums, 221 Miss. 833, 74 So. 2d 866 (1954).
27. Donehue v. Nilges, 364 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553 (1954).
28. In re Dee's Estate, 180 Kan. 772, 308 P.2d 90 (1957).
29. In re Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
30. Id. at 641, 162 A.2d at 633.
31. E.g., Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434 (1859); Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 19
A.2d 82 (1941).
32. PA. STAT. § 301.5(b) (1950).
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defeasible fee in the church immediately became absolute and the
church could benefit from the sale of the land. This is a very practical
problem and in no sense academic, as more and more older churches
in urban areas become surrounded by industrial and commercial
uses. School consolidation also presents the same problem, as to the
schools being abandoned. Problems concerning defeasible fees are
arising with increasing frequency.
It is time to turn to the tale of the second case, although this is
more of a rule that arose from Massachusetts rather than the case
itself. Rice v. Boston & Worcester R.R.P at least started the trouble
by holding that the right of entry following a fee on condition
subsequent was inalienable. Later cases found the possibility of
reverter following a determinable fee was alienablem thus creating
a rule in Massachusetts that the possibility of reverter could be
alienated but not the right of entry. This is the tale of the second
case (or cases) to be considered.
The Rice case also perpetuated an error made by the Maine court
in Hooper v. Cummings 5 By a misconstruction of Viner's Abridg-
ment,6 it had been held that an attempt to alienate a right of entry
would destroy it. Fortunately, only a few jurisdictions followed this
error. An annotator has disposed of this rule as follows:
It is not difficult to imagine that a layman, browsing in the green and fertile
pastures of the law reports... might wonder by what legerdermain a right,
created by solemn compact between grantor and grantee, had been made to
vanish into thin air. It would puzzle him to understand how an unsuccessful
attempt to convey can have the effect of destroying the thing that is not
conveyed. "How is it," he would say, "that what does not pass does not
remain?"37
However, one writer has stated that this "is still the rule followed
by the overwhelming weight of authority."3 8 The Restatement of the
Law of Property labeled the right of entry a "power of termination"
and stated that it would be destroyed by an attempted alienation,
but this was too much even for the Restatement, so this view was
reversed.39 It is not intended to pursue this point in the present
33. 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866).
34. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950);
Dyer v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N.E.2d 451 (1937).
35. 45 Me. 359 (1858).
36. 5 Vn-ER's ABRmGmENT, Condition (I.d. 15) *306.
37. Annot., 1916F L.R.A. 311 See also dissent of Potter, J., in Dolby v. Dillman,
283 Mich, 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938).
38. Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-Entry,
22 B.U.L. REv. 43,47 (1942).
39. RESTATEMENT, Popzy § 160, comment c (1936). The position, of the 1936
Restatement was reversed in 1948. RESTATEMENT, PloPEnTr § 160, comment c (Supp.
1948).
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discussion. Sufficient warning of this trap appears in the secondary
authorities so that it is unlikely that any court today would be caught.
The Rice case helped lay a trap that is ready to catch the unwary.
It largely created a rule that the possibility of reverter was alienable
and the right of entry was not alienable. It stated the American fiction
that neither interest was assignable at common law, but this generally
accepted rule was based on a complete absence of English authority.
It is a difficult rule to apply because of the problem of telling one of
the two interests from the other. They can only be defined by saying
that the possibility of reverter is the interest retained by an owner
of land in fee simple who has created a determinable fee in another,
and that the right of entry is the interest retained when a fee on
condition subsequent is created in another. These two kinds of de-
feasible fees are difficult to distinguish when they are met in the
middle of the road and this distinction has caused confusion in the
cases. However, we find that this "Massachusetts rule" is with us
today and states that the possibility of reverter is alienable but the
right of entry (or power of termination) is not alienable. It is sub-
mitted that until 1961 this was the rule only in Massachusetts and
in no other jurisdiction.
The local law of Massachusetts has been taught and considered
as the "weight of authority" by one law school in that state and its
disciples so long that most writers of secondary authorities today
meekly acquiesce and follow along. It is often stated that there is
no good reason why there should be any distinction between the
right of entry and the possibility of reverter as to alienability, but
that the "weight of authority" creates such a distinction.40 The
encyclopedias and annotators follow along, but hedge a little by
adding "in the absence of statute."41 It is difficult to see how law
schools today continue to operate the case method "in the absence
of statute." Judges and lawyers look at the statutes first of all.
Statutes today are a major part of the law. What, then, is the real
situation as to the alienability of these interests today "in the presence
of statutes?"
It is naturally true that in a number of states the change in
alienability would affect only instruments effective after the date
of the statute. Michigan is a typical example, with its 1931 statute.42
A look at the present status of the states reveals a somewhat
40. 1 AmunscAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.6, 4.68, 4.7 (1952); RESTATEMENT, op. cit.
supra note 39, §§ 159, 160; Snmis & SMrrH, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 1860, 1862.
41. 19 AM. JuR. Estates § 83 (1939); 33 AM. Jun. Life Estates Remainders §§ 206,
209 (1941); 6 C.J.S. Assignments § 13 (1936); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 148 (1956); 31
C.J.S. Estates §§ 10, 20, 105b (1964); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 224 (1957).




different weight of authority. Georgia and Ohio will be reserved for
later consideration. Fourteen states have held both the right of entry
and the possibility of reverter to be freely alienable. They are
Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, and Virginia.43 In some of these states alienability was created
by statute which changed a former rule of decision of inalienability.
In another six states, one of the interests has been held alienable,
with sufficient dicta to probably include the other interest. They are
Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, and Vermont.44 In
ten states, both interests are considered to be inalienable. They are
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.45  In three
other states, one of the interests has been held inalienable, with
43. (In this footnote and the following two footnotes cases and statutes are
arranged together by jurisdiction for the convenience of the reader.) CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 47-29 (1958); Fitch v. State, 139 Conn. 456, 95 A.2d 255
(1953); Richard v. Chicago, B. & O.R.R., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942);
Jacobs v. Miller, 253 Iowa 213, 111 N.W.2d 673 (1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 67-205
(1949); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hollow, 70 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 573 (1934); Austin v. Calvert, 262 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. App. 1953);
MICH. ComP. LAws, § 554.111 (1948); Schooleraft Community School Dist. v. Burson,
supra note 42; MNN. STAT. § 500.16 (1957); State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31,
123 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1963); Waddell v. School Dist., 79 Mont. 432, 257 Pac. 278
(1927); N.J. REv. STAT. § 46:3-7 (1937); Guyer v. YMCA 142 N.J.E.Q. 400, 60 A.2d
276 (Ch. 1948); N.M. STAT. §§ 70-1-3, 1-21 (1953); Prince v. Charles Ilfeld Co., 72
N.M. 351, 383 P.2d 827 (1963); Fuhr v. Oklahoma City, 194 Okla. 482, 153 P.2d
115 (1944); Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa. Super. 519, 39 A.2d 307 (1944); London v.
Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 81 A.2d 870 (1951); R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-4-11 (1956); Perry
v. Smith, 198 S.W. 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), rev'd, 231 S.W. 340 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1921); James v. Dalhart Consol. Independent School Dist., 254 S.W.2d 826
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930);
County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38 (1950); Sanford v. Sims,
191 Va. 644, 66 S.E.2d 495 (1951).
44. Moore v. Sharpe, 91 Ark. 407, 121 S.W. 341 (1909); CAL. CIv. CODE § 699;
Los Angeles & Arizona Land Co. v. Marr, 187 Cal. 126, 200 Pac. 1051 (1921);
Shields v. Bank of America, 37 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. App. 1964); Richardson v.
Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So. 2d 641 (1948); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-109, 502 (1957);
Ricks vj Merchants Nat'l Bank, 191 Miss. 323, 2 So. 2d 344 (1941); Collette v. Town
of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357, 45 A.2d 203 (1946); Dickerman v. Town of Pittsford,
116 Vt. 563, 80 A.2d 529 (1951).
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37b (Smith-Hurd 1963); Village of Peoria Heights v.
Keithley, 299 Ill. 427, 132 N.E. 532 (1921); Federal Land Bank v. Luckenbill, 213
Ind. 616, 13 N.E.2d 531 (1938) (semble); Hooper v. Cummings, 45 Me. 359
(1858); Pond v. Douglas, 106 Me. 85, 75 Adt. 320 (1909); Nicoll v. N.Y. & Erie R.R.,
12 N.Y. 121 (1854; Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-02 (1960); Wagner v. Wallowa County, 76 Ore. 453, 148
Pac. 1140 (1915); Magness v. Kerr, 121 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012 (1927); First
Presbyterian Church v. Elliott, 65 S.C. 251, 43 S.E. 674 (1903); Purvis v. McElveen,
234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959); S.D. CODE § 51.1301 (1939); Rowbotharn v.
Jackson, 68 S.D. 566, 5 N.W.2d 36 (1942); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221,
269 S.W. 36 (1925); Humphreys County Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 39, 134
S.W. 863 (1911).
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sufficient dicta probably to include the other interest. They are
Alabama, Colorado, and Delaware.4 6
Ohio followed the Massachusetts rule of a distinction between the
alienability of the two interests.47 However, a 1953 statute made both
interests alienable, so that left Massachusetts standing alone. Thus
in 1961 we find Massachusetts as the only jurisdiction making any
distinction as to the alienability of the right of entry and the possi-
bility of reverter, but the secondary authorities cited this rule as the
"weight of authority." The trap was ready. It caught a victim. The
Georgia court fell completely in. May this be a lesson to others.
In Franks v. Sparks,49 the Georgia court held that a right of entry
was not alienable. The court on this point relied entirely on two
encyclopedias and one treatise that had stated the rule from Massa-
chusetts, with no real consideration of the problem involved and no
consideration of the cases.50 Chief Justice Duckworth dissented and
stated that the interest was alienable, but did not discuss the point
at length. The court cited Evans v. Brown51 as to the nature of the
defeasible fee, but not on the question of alienability. The Evans
case had clearly held that a right of entry after breach of the condition
subsequent was alienable and stated that the effect of a conveyance
before breach was not then for consideration under the facts of that
case. Under the Georgia rule, the Evans case being a full bench
decision was controlling on the court. In a number of other cases,
the Georgia court had held the possibility of reverter to be alienable
and the dicta was strong enough to have included the right of entry. 2
In falling into the trap in the Franks case, the Georgia court simply
accepted the encyclopaedic statements based on the Massachusetts
rule without a real understanding or consideration of the problem.
Thus, in this area the score stands twenty-one in favor of the
alienability of both interests and thirteen opposed to alienability, with
Massachusetts and Georgia finding the possibility of reverter to
46. Davis v. Memphis & Charleston R.R., 87 Ala. 633, 6 So. 140 (1889); Union
Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939); Cookman v. Silliman, 22 Del.
Ch. 303, 2 A.2d 166 (1938).
47. Reiter v. Pennsylvania Co., 29 Ohio Dec. 125 (1917); Joseph Schonthal Co. v.
Village of Sylvania, 60 Ohio App. 407, 21 N.E.2d 1008 (1938).
48. Omo REV. CODE. § 2131.04 (1953); PCK Properties Inc. v. City of Cuyahoga
Falls, 112 Ohio App. 492, 176 N.E.2d 441 (1960) (dictum).
49. 217 Ga. 117, 121 S.E.2d 27 (1961).
50. 19 Am. Jun. op. cit. supra note 41, at 546; 33 Am. Jun. op. cit. supra note 41,
at 690; 31 C.J.S. Estates § 20, at 32 (1964); 26 C.J.S. op. cit. supra note 41, at
1052-54; 4 THoMPsoN, REAL PitoPERTY 687 (1961).
51. 196 Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300 (1943).
52. E.g., Williams v. Thomas County, 208 Ga. 103, 65 S.E.2d 412 (1951); Joel v.
Joel, 201 Ga. 520, 40 S.E.2d 541 (1946); Shockley v. Storey, 185 Ga. 790, 196
S.E. 702 (1938); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 183 Ga. 432, 188 S.E. 722 (1936); Wilcoxon
v. Harrison, 32 Ga. 480 (1852).
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be alienable and the right of entry inalienable. To steal from Pro-
fessor Leach, "Hail, Massachusettsl"F-but please not as the "weight
of authority." It is hoped that in due time Georgia will correct this
error and once again leave Massachusetts standing alone. The fact
that free alienability of both interests is desirable seems obvious
and need not be belabored.
Now for the moral, of this tale, if it has a moral. The things that
you read in the encyclopedias and treatises, they "ain't necessarily
so." Future Interests should not be for the few, either lawyers or
judges. Many present leaders at the bar completed their legal educa-
tion at a time when few law schools taught a course in Future
Interests. Continuing legal education programs might well include
some fundamentals of Future Interests ahead of their Estate Planning
courses. A little knowledge in this area is truly a dangerous thing
and has produced some weird decisions.
53. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania! 108 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1124
(1960).
